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World Peace Through World Law:
The Disarmament Problem
The rule of law among nations becomes meaningful, according to
the author, only in proportion to the assurance nations have that
others will not resort to force to settle disputes. The primary purpose
and function of disarmament, in the context of world law, is to lessen
the incentive to resort to force. Its secondary purpose is to serve as
a significant token of a nation's desire for a peaceful world. The dis-
armament problem begins with the search for what is negotiable, he
states.
by William W. Schwarzer - of the California Bar (San Francisco)
FOR SOME time now the American
Bar Association has espoused the
cause of world peace through world
law. A basic assumption underlying
this proposition is that international
disputes should be settled without re-
sort to arms. World peace through
world law therefore envisions some
form of "disarmament". It is mean-
ingless to the extent that nations are
left the option to appeal an unsatis-
factory decision to arms. Some time
may pass before an international sher-
iff rides to enforce the law but mean-
while, if world peace through world
law is to be more than an empty
phrase, there must be some evidence
of progress toward rejection of the
alternative of force as a means for
attaining national objectives.
Grave danger, however, lies in con-
fusing the domestic rule of law with
an international rule of law. The citi-
zen living in an organized society sur-
renders his right to use force as a
means of attaining his ends in exchange
for the collective security which soci-
ety affords him by the equivalent sur-
render of all of his fellow citizens. But
a nation as the guardian of the na-
tional interests of all of its citizens,
cannot be expected to surrender its
right to protect these national inter-
ests by force unless it is assured that
no other nation will threaten them
with force. Thus the rule of law among
nations becomes meaningful only in
proportion to the assurance nations
have that others will not resort to force
to settle disputes.
Much remains to be done before
world peace through world law grows
into something more than a slogan.
One great task is to define world law
so that nations may be able to predict
more accurately their rights, duties
and liabilities as nations. Equally im-
portant will be the establishment of
machinery for enforcement of the law,
for without it law is nothing but
exhortation. But before this point can
be reached, the crucial foundation
must be laid by diminishing the in-
centives to resort to force. The primary
purpose and function of disarmament,
in the context of world law, is to lessen
the incentive to resort to force. Its
secondary purpose is to serve as a sig-
nificant token of a nation's desire for a
peaceful world. For these reasons dis-
armament in some form appears to be
a corollary of the concept of world
peace through world law.
It is not the intention here to pre-
sent a comprehensive or definitive anal-
ysis of disarmament or even to sug-
gest that there are not many other and
perhaps more important things to be
said about it. The only purpose of this
paper is to call attention to the other
side of the coin of world peace through
world law-the accustomed use of
force among nations. We cannot, it




Disarmament, like any catch phrase,
suffers from a lack of definition. It
may but does not necessarily mean
that all nations shall lay down their
arms forever. It may mean reduction
in the number or variety of weapons
produced or in existence, or in the size
of armies. It may also mean control
over the use of arms or merely in-
spection of military installations and
formations. It may refer to any scheme
of arms control, reduction, inspection
or stabilization, unilateral or agreed,
whether yet known or not, which
lessens the likelihood of a resort to
arms, and in this broad sense it is
used here.
Past history does not augur well for
the prospects of disarmament. There
Note: This paper is based in part on discus-
sions of the clisaymarnt stvdy grOup of the
World Affairs Council of Northern California in
San Francisco, held during the winter and
spring, 1960-1961. The views expressed, how-
ever, are the writer's. In addition, for the
benefit of the interested reader, reference
should be made to the special issue on Arms
Control of DaedalUs, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF ART5 AND SCIENCE (Fall, 1960),
which of the many recent publications is per-
haps the most comprehensive and well-rounded
review of the arms control problem to date.
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is no known successful precedent.'
Nevertheless, the demonstrated and
abiding desire of people throughout
the world for the abolition of war as a
means of settling disputes makes it
imperative that efforts to achieve some
form of disarmament be continued,
and on a greater scale than ever before.
It particularly behooves lawyers, ad-
vocating world peace through world
law, to think how the objective may be
achieved. Clear thinking on the dis-
armament scene is plainly called for.
In essence the problem of disarma-
ment is a problem of weighing risks.
No form of disarmament is likely to
afford complete security to a nation.
Evasion, error and surprise are always
possible. Yet we know that the rapid
advance in arms technology and the
proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction confront us with a continu-
ally increasing risk of war. The grow-
ing role played by highly complex
electronic weapons systems increases
the hazard of accidental war. The
mounting tension which accompanies
the arms race increases the chances of
miar through diplomatic blunder or
nmiscalculation. Thus, any fruitful anal-
ysis of the disarmament problem must
start from the realization that perfect
security is unattainable and that the
question will always be one of degree.
The source of the insecurity lies not
so much in the existence of weapons
as in the fundamental conflicts of the
core interests of nations. Each nation,
motivated by a desire for maximum
physical security, tends by advancing
that purpose to threaten the security
of others. The United States, for ex-
ample, has built a chain of military
bases around the Soviet Union for the
obvious purpose of enhancing our
ability to protect our territory, yet
with the inevitable result of impairing
the Soviet Union's feeling of security.
The Soviet Union, believing that its
own security requires a closed society,
has greatly increased our insecurity
by concealing many of its actions be-
hind an iron curtain. There are many
other national core interests; they nat-
urally change from time to time and
they are not necessarily all ascertain-
able. The Soviet Union's core interests
may extend to the maintenance of a
closed society and to the exclusion of
hostile governments from certain areas
adjacent to its borders. The United
States, on the other hand, would insist
on maintaining a relatively free society
and on resisting aggression in particu-
larly vital areas of the world. So also
it is with other nations.
The significance of core interests is
that they represent non-negotiable mat-
ters. No matter what the threat or the
promised reward, neither the United
States nor other nations would be will-
ing to bargain over certain proposi-
tions deemed to be crucial to the
nation's security. The disarmament
problem therefore begins with the
search for what is negotiable. As one
observer recently put it, "We will not
find out whether the Russians will go
through a door until we stop pushing
them through a locked door." Out of
the context of history, geography,
technology and psychology, every na-
tion has developed a complex of secur-
ity interests, many of which may be
core interests and therefore non-nego-
tiable. But the shifting balances of
security in a world of rapidly chang-
ing technology and political complexion
may from time to time open up new
areas for negotiation. For example,
American bases abroad may have been
non-negotiable ten years ago; the de-
velopment of long-range missiles and
in-flight refueling may now make these
bases a subject for bargaining.
The Initial Approach
to Disarmament
The initial approach to disarmament
must be twofold: one, to find the areas
in which bargaining is possible, and,
two, to proceed in awareness of a con-
tinuing conflict of core interests in
other areas. The realization that the
demands of national security, as seen
by the various nations, will continue
for some time to produce clashing core
interests is vital to a realistic approach
here. As Americans we are prone to
look for an apocalyptic solution to the
cold war. We tend to believe that if
only the right fornmula is discovered
and the right paper signed, our present
conflicts and dangers will end. Yet
history tells us that the antagonism of
major powers is likely to be with us
indefinitely, regardless of the prevail-
ing ideologies. The cold war is pri-
marily a current manifestation of this
antagonism and we would do well to
pursue the effort toward disarmament
with the realization that in a world
of nations, inter-nation conflict is in-
evitable.
Much as we abhor such conflict, no
progress is likely to be made as long
as we cast the conflict in moral terms.
The prejudices on which national se-
curity judgments are often made are
too deep-seated to respond to moral
exhortation or condemnation. If we
base our policies of attaining disarma-
ment and world peace on the hope of
converting our enemies, we are sad-
dling ourselves with a built-in guaran-
tee of failure. Similarly, it would be
tragic if elimination of the use of
force were to be tied to the elimination
of the use of national power in inter-
national affairs. So long as there are
nations, they will compete for power
and influence and we can only hope to
channel action away from major
armed conflicts. Common sense dictates
therefore that only by patiently search-
ing out the areas in which negotiation
and agreement are possible and by
working for limited objectives first, or
what C. L. Sulzberger has called "a
brushfire peace", can progress be made.
Lessening Incentives
To Resort to Force
There is little hope that any of the
major powers will soon succeed in per-
suading any other to change its basic
national security policies. There is
great hope, however, that through
negotiation and international co-opera-
tion, the incentives to resort to force
can be lessened. We have, in one way,
sought to lessen the incentive to make
war by adopting, after World War II,
a policy of deterrence through the
threat of nuclear retaliation. By threat-
ening massive destruction of any nation
which should choose to attack us, we
have attempted to lessen the incentive
1. Although on occasions throughout history,
nations have entered into treaties which have
satisfactorily settled disputes among them and
have brought about long intervals of peace (the
Congress of Vienna, the arrangements between
Canada and the United States), there is no
record of a successful inspected disarmament
arrangement. The closest approximation is the
Hague Convention. which has helped to impose
some rules on the conduct of war. Events in
the Korean War and recent developments in
the destructive force of weapons render these
rules relatively meaningless.
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for an attack. But such a policy-
necessary as it is in the present state
of things-is fraught with danger and,
by tending to keep the world teetering
near the brink of international disaster,
may carry the seed of its own failure.
While nothing suggests that we can
safely abandon nuclear deterrence, the
potential horror implicit in such a
policy calls for the development of
alternative means for removing the in-
centive to war.
All of the evidence points to mutual
fear of attack on the part of the United
States and the Soviet Union as the
greatest potential hazard. As Herman
Kahn puts it, "The big thing that the
Soviet Union and the United States
have to fear from each other is fear
itself."' 2 The fact that each of the major
antagonists has adopted a policy of
deterrence leads to the conclusion that
fear of attack is the dominant policy
motive, that it may be the greatest in-
centive to be the first to launch an
attack, and that it may therefore be
the greatest cause of instability. High-
est priority therefore needs to be given
to complementing deterrence with re-
assurance.
This is one of the most difficult
tasks facing the nuclear nations. Ever
since the Open Sky proposals of 1955,
sporadic attempts have been made to
find ways of lessening the risk and the
fear of surprise attack. Changing tech-
nology has changed the conditions of
1955 and it is doubtful that overflights
would today-or tomorrow-give ade-
quate assurance. Other methods may,
however, be available or discoverable
which through limited inspection, sur-
veillance or checks may give reason-
able assurances against surprise attack.
In any case, the dilemma likely to be
inherent in any method is that as na-
tions proceed to give assurances to
each other, they also tend to make
themselves more vulnerable. A lessen-
ing of the capacity to launch a surprise
attack may tend to lessen retaliatory
capability. An increase in the efficacy
of inspection improves the targeting
capacity of the inspecting nation. Ways
must therefore be found for lessening
the incentive to attack which grows out
of fear, without increasing the incen-
tive by improving the prospects for
success.
Beyond the military implications,
any system of inspection or surveil-
lance, even if limited, confronts a na-
tion with hard political choices, choices
of particular concern to lawyers. How
far are we prepared to go in opening
our borders to inspection by agents
of an international or supranational
agency? What discovery powers would
we grant to international inspectors?
How far shall we permit the constitu-
tional guarantees against unreasonable
search and seizure to be modified by
a disarmament treaty, and what is to
be the status of inspectors under state
and local law? If we have concerns
and reservations, how much greater
would be those of a closed society such
as the Soviet Union, which may believe
international inspection to be synony-
mous with internal upheaval. We do
not need to respect these fears to rec-
ognize them. Much as the Russians
may value disarmament, we should be
expecting the impossible if we were to
look for them to open their society
within the immediate future. Again, we
see that for disarmament efforts to be
meaningful they must be carried on in
areas which are realistically negotiable
and for limited objectives, bearing in
mind that without small beginnings no
great results are likely to be achieved.
We are not likely, then, to achieve
disarmament and a peaceful world by
bullying our opponents or by convert-
ing them to our view of the world.
Disarmament is a bargaining problem,
calling for the greatest bargaining skills
-skills with which lawyers are par-
ticularly familiar. We must find the
areas in which progress can be made,
and we must negotiate for ends which
will be attractive to both parties to the
negotiation. Above all, we must demon-
strate our willingness to bargain pa-
tiently and understandingly, and we
must show the world that we are
neither unreasonable nor gullible.
Other Factors Affecting
Disarmament Prospects
There are additional factors which
affect the prospects for disarmament.
One of these is the relative weight
given to defensive as against offensive
capability in our military planning. It
is at least arguable that an increased
effort on our part to harden our missile
Romnaine of M oulin
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bases, to develop a second strike capa-
bility that would survive a surprise
attack, to perfect anti-missile missiles
and to provide shelters for our civilian
population may assure other nations
not only that an attack on us would
probably not be profitable, but that
our intentions are defensive rather than
aggressive. Another factor is our ca-
pacity to resist aggression with non-
nuclear weapons and to fight less than
total wars. Maintenance of this kind
of capability may also help to keep our
antagonists from blundering into a
major war by making it clear to them
that we could and would resist limited
aggression. In short, we must try to
demonstrate to those with whom we
would negotiate that we do not intend
to act in a manner inconsistent with
what we are asking them to do.
The approach to disarmament does
not lie solely through bargaining and
formal agreement. The existence of a
signed treaty unfortunately-as history
demonstrates-does not provide assur-
ance of its being honored. In the pres-
ent state of world law, a treaty at best
2. 3 STANFORD ttUSEARCH INSTITUTE JOURNAL
140 (1959).
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can only reflect accommodations that
are self-enforcing by reason of built-in
incentives. But accommodations of this
kind are possible and probable with-
out being reduced to writing. In fact,
numerous accommodations appear to
have been made over the years between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
Examples are the moratorium on nu-
clear testing and the limitations ob-
served in fighting in Korea and in the
Formosa Straits. In addition, each
nation appears to have respected cer-
tain strategic interests of the other.
Neither has employed nuclear weapons
since the second world war, and each
to a limited extent has by aerial and
other forms of intelligence permitted
the other to inspect and test its re-
sponses to limited provocation. In
large part, these and other forms of
accommodation have probably never
been subjects of negotiation or agree-
nient, but they are evidence of a real
though tacit working arrangement.
Opportunities for further meaning-
ful accommodations may arise at any
time and may open the way for sub-
stantial progress toward the ultimate
disarmament goal, whether a formal
treaty is ever made or not. This coun-
try must be alert to such opportunities,
and its policy and leadership must be
sufficiently intelligent, subtle and flex-
ible to take advantage of them when
they may be beneficial to us. Converse-
ly, while we must be firm on the essen-
tials, we must avoid provocation and
blunder which will forestall accommo-
dation without giving compensating
security benefits. In many sensitive
areas, such as the future of West and
East Germany, and the distribution of
nuclear weapons to other nations, the
choice among courses of action will




Progress toward disarmament de-
mands our best efforts. No better
cause for the application of talent and
resources can be imagined than the
avoidance of a nuclear war. Compared
to what we have spent on our war-
making capability, what we have spent
on war-preventing capability is less
than puny. Compared to our knowledge
in other national and international
areas, our ignorance of things relating
to disarmament is appalling. The
causes of our lack of progress and
knowledge lie not solely in our indiffer-
ence. As the complexity and sophistica-
tion of weapons systems have grown,
disarmament has tended to become the
province of scientists and specialists.
Intelligent discussion of the control
and surveillance of missiles, for exam-
ple, is virtually impossible without an
understanding of their technical and
operating characteristics, an under-
standing shared by few laymen. The
very growth of the role of the scientist
and technician in the disarmament
field, however, underscores the impor-
tance of active participation by politi-
cal leaders and by informed and ar-
ticulate lay citizens.
The job of working for disarmament
will require that we periodically re-
examine our basic assumptions con
cerning security and national policy.
Yesterday's truth may become tomor-
row's folly. We shall be confronted
with situations that are neither black
nor white, and with choices between
unsatisfactory alternatives. All of this
suggests the need for informed and
sympathetic citizens who can help di-
rect and support national policy in this
difficult area. Nowhere else are we like-
ly to have to make more difficult deci-
sions with respect to our national values
and goals-nowhere else will it be as
hard to translate our national aspira-
tions into a viable policy. The future of
our institutions will rest on the wisdom
of the choices we make between vari-
ous forms of security.
The lawyer, of course, carries a
particular responsibility in the preser-
vation of our values and our institu-
tions and in their adaptation to a
changing world. He has assumed even
broader responsibilities in urging the
rule of law as the touchstone for peace.
To advocate that law replace force in
international affairs without a candid
appreciation of the tough choices that
must be made on the way would be a
cruel hoax. At the same time, to con-
demn world peace through world law
because it conflicts with outmoded con-
cepts of national sovereignty is irre-
sponsible. World peace, world law and
disarmament are necessary and possi-
ble, but they lie at the far end of a
long and tortuous road. Nowhere else
are the hopes held higher, and no-
where else are the consequences of
failure more fearsome.
Canon 35 Sustained
The Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina on November 14, 1961 in State v.
Sharpe, upheld Canon 35 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar
Association. The Canon states that the
taking of photographs in the court-
room, during sessions of the court
or recesses between sessions, and the
broadcasting or televising of court pro.
ceedings should not be permitted.
After referring to a similiar pro-
vision of Rule 53 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the court in its
opinion by Judge Moss said:
We agree that Canon 35 . . . should
be enforced in the trial of cases in
the courts of this State. The Canon
sets forth a standard which should gov-
ern the conduct of judicial proceed-
ings. To allow a deviation therefrom
would permit distractions or disturb-
ances that are inimical to judicious
conduct.
We are fully conscious that there
has been criticism of Canon 35 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics. Members
of the press and representatives of the
radio and television industries, and
some judges and lawyers, argue that
the restriction of Canon 35 is a viola-
tion of the freedom of the press. Atten-
tion is directed to an article by William
0. Douglas, Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States,
who answers the critics of Canon 35.
This article is reported in Vol. 46, at
page 840, of the American Bar Asso.
ciation Journal.
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